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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/495,036	01/31/2000	Ruibing Hao	29250-000920/US	4280
75	90 04/01/2005		EXAMINER	
John E Curtin			PHILPOTT,	JUSTIN M
HARNESS DICKEY & PIERCE PLC		ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER	
P O Box 8910 Reston, VA 20	0195		2665	TALER NOMBER

DATE MAILED: 04/01/2005

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

	UN.		:
	Application No.	Applicant(s)	:
Advisory Action	09/495,036	HAO ET AL.	:
Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief	Examiner	Art Unit	:
	Justin M Philpott	2665	: -
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ears on the cover sheet with the o	correspondence add	lress
THE REPLY FILED 03 March 2005 FAILS TO PLACE THIS A	PPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR	ALLOWANCE.	
1.  The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to filin applicant must timely file one of the following replies: (1 application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Ap Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in complianc time periods:	) an amendment, affidavit, or other peal (with appeal fee) in complianc e with 37 CFR 1.114. The reply mu	evidence, which place e with 37 CFR 41.31;	es the or (3) a
a) The period for reply expires 3 months from the mailing date of			: :
<ul> <li>The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Ad- event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later the</li> </ul>			er is later. In no
Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (b MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(		IRST REPLY WAS FILE	D WITHIN TWO
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date or been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened si above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three month earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).  NOTICE OF APPEAL	and the corresponding amount of the fee. tatutory period for reply originally set in the	The appropriate extension final Office action; or (2)	on fee under 37 as set forth in (b)
2. The reply was filed after the date of filing a Notice of Appwas filed on A brief in compliance with 37 CFR Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any extension thereof (37 Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed within the AMENDMENTS	41.37 must be filed within two mon CFR 41.37(e)), to avoid dismissal of time period set forth in 37 CFR 41.	ths of the date of filing of the appeal. Since a .37(a).	g the Notice of a Notice of
<ol> <li>The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection         <ul> <li>They raise new issues that would require further or</li> <li>They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE below</li> </ul> </li> </ol>	onsideration and/or search (see NC ow);	TE below);	:
(c) ☐ They are not deemed to place the application in be appeal; and/or	etter form for appeal by materially r	educing or simplifying	the issues for
(d) They present additional claims without canceling a	corresponding number of finally re	ejected claims.	•
NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)	).		:
4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.		ompliant Amendmen	t (PTOL-324).
<ul> <li>5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s)</li> <li>6. Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be a</li> </ul>		e, timely filed amendn	nent canceling
the non-allowable claim(s).  7. To purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a how the new or amended claims would be rejected is proof the status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:		vill be entered and an	explanation of
Claim(s) allowed: Claim(s) objected to: Claim(s) rejected: Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration:			:
AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE			:
8. The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, to because applicant failed to provide a showing of good a and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).			
9. The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filin entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessar	overcome all rejections under appe	eal and/or appellant fa	ails to provide a
10. The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanati REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER	-		
11.  The request for reconsideration has been considered by	ut does NOT place the application	in condition for allowa	ance because:

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SUPERVISORY PATENT EXAMINER
TECHNOLOGY CENTER 2600

13. Other: \_\_\_\_.

12. Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s). (PTO/SB/08 or PTO-1449) Paper No(s).

## Applicant's arguments are not persuasive.

First, applicant argues that Fitzgerald does not include "evaluation of the inter-operability of communications systems" (page 5). In response to this argument, it is first noted that the only claim limitations reciting this or similar language are found in the preamble of claim 1. A preamble is generally not accorded any patentable weight where it merely recites the purpose of a process or the intended use of a structure, and where the body of the claim does not depend on the preamble for completeness but, instead, the process steps or structural limitations are able to stand alone. See In re Hirao, 535 F.2d 67, 190 USPQ 15 (CCPA 1976) and Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d 150, 152, 88 USPQ 478, 481 (CCPA 1951). Thus, in response to applicant's arguments, the recitation "evaluation of the inter-operability of communications systems" has not been given patentable weight because the recitation occurs in the preamble. Accordingly, this argument is moot. However, even if applicant's claims were amended to include this limitation within the body of the claim, Fitzgerald clearly teaches this broad limitation. That is, Fitzgerald teaches evaluating the interoperability of communications systems by evaluating the quality of service characteristics of various different network subsystems (e.g., see col. 2, lines 19-62). Thus, applicant's argument that Fitzgerald fails to teach such a limitation is not persuasive.

Second, applicant argues that Fitzgerald "requires the installation of loopback interfaces at one or more routers" (page 5), and applicant's claims do not recite such a limitation. In response to applicant's argument that Fitzgerald comprises an additional step, if true, applicant's claimed invention comprises broader limitations than the teachings of Fitzgerald and accordingly applicant's claimed invention cannot be patentable over Fitzgerald for this reason. That is, applicant cannot claim an invention more broadly than the cited art and persuasively argue that it should be patentable over the art which includes all of the limitations as well as potentially additional teachings. Accordingly, applicant's argument is not persuasive.

Third, applicant argues that "[t]he measurement of delay [in Fitzgerald] is not a desired mode of operation" (page 6, first paragraph). However, applicant has misrepresented Examiner's previous discussion of Fitzgerald in the Final Office action of December 29, 2004. Examiner has clearly equated a "desired mode of operation" as recited in applicant's claims to be that of "delay-free calling" in Fitzgerald (see Final Office action, December 29, 2004, page 2). It is not the "measurement" of delay that is a desired mode of operation, but rather, the function itself of operating in a "delay-free" mode that is the desired mode of operation. Clearly, Fitzgerald teaches the broad language of applicant's claim 1 reciting "implement[ing] the desired mode of operation" (e.g., see col. 2, lines 19-62).

Fourth, applicant argues that "Fitzgerald is simply not concerned, either explicitly or implicitly, with the operation or inter-operability of systems 14, 31" (page 6, first paragraph). In response to this argument, as discussed above, it is first noted that the only claim limitations reciting this or similar language are found in the preamble of claim 1. A preamble is generally not accorded any patentable weight where it merely recites the purpose of a process or the intended use of a structure, and where the body of the claim does not depend on the preamble for completeness but, instead, the process steps or structural limitations are able to stand alone. See In re Hirao, 535 F.2d 67, 190 USPQ 15 (CCPA 1976) and Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d 150, 152, 88 USPQ 478, 481 (CCPA 1951). Thus, in response to applicant's arguments, the recitation "evaluation of the inter-operability of communications systems" has not been given patentable weight because the recitation occurs in the preamble. Accordingly, this argument is moot. However, even if applicant's claims were amended to include this limitation within the body of the claim, Fitzgerald clearly teaches this broad limitation. That is, Fitzgerald teaches evaluating the interoperability of communications systems by evaluating the quality of service characteristics of various different network subsystems (e.g., see col. 2, lines 19-62). Thus, applicant's argument that Fitzgerald fails to teach such a limitation is not persuasive.

Fifth, applicant argues that applicant's specification includes specific limitations which indicate applicant's claimed "acyclic paths" are different from Fitzgerald's "network topology". In response to applicant's argument that the references fail to show certain features of applicant's invention, it is noted that the features upon which applicant relies (i.e., limitations on page 14 of applicant's specification with respect to an acyclic path) are not recited in the rejected claim(s). Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Thus, applicant's argument is moot.